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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Doran Carl Eslinger appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance. Eslinger claims the district court
erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eslinger parked his car in the courthouse parking lot and went inside the
courthouse. (10/27/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 20 – p. 6, L. 25.) 1 At Detective Deitrick’s
request, Officer Shore had his drug dog do an exterior sniff of Eslinger’s parked
vehicle. (10/27/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 23 – p. 6, L. 20; 5/12/15 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 – p. 12,
L. 23.) The drug dog altered on the driver’s side door. (5/12/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 8 –
p. 14, L. 16.) Before the officers could go inside the courthouse and get a
warrant, they encountered Eslinger as he returned to his car.

(10/27/14 Tr.,

p. 7, Ls. 3-14, p. 28, Ls. 13-16.) The officers spoke with Eslinger:
Detective Deitrick: Where? Okay. Hey, we just had a drug dog hit
on your car, so what we’re doing right now is we’re applying for a
search warrant, unless you would like to give us consent to search
your car.
Mr. Eslinger: Well, I don’t know why it would hit on our car.
Detective Deitrick: Well, it did, and we – basically right now we’re
going to apply for a warrant and impound the car and search it.
Detective Jared: Or you can give consent. Well, just do it faster.
We’re going to do it either way.
Mr. Eslinger: Yeah, I know. Well, you can look. I don’t know.
1

The district court considered the evidence presented at Eslinger’s preliminary
hearing in determining the motion to suppress. (See R., pp. 130-131).
1

(Ex. 1 at p. 2, Ls. 6-19. 2)
The officers searched Eslinger’s car and found a small brown pouch up
against the driver’s seat. (10/27/14 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-25.) Inside the pouch was a
smaller pouch and a glass pipe with white residue in it, as well as a white bag
with crystal in it. (10/27/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 18 – p. 15.) At that point Detective
Deitrick stopped his search, secured the pouch, and obtained a search warrant
the next day. (10/27/14 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 7-23.) Pursuant to the execution of the
search warrant, Detective Deitrick found a digital scale and methamphetamine.
(10/27/14 Tr., p. 8, L. 24 – p. 9, L. 19.)
The state charged Eslinger with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 75-76.) Eslinger
filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his
car. (R., pp. 87-92.) The state filed a memorandum in opposition. (R., pp. 104117.)

The district court held a hearing on Eslinger’s motion to suppress.

(R., pp. 128-129.)
The district court held that Eslinger’s consent was “equivocal at best” and
found that the state failed to prove Eslinger voluntarily consented to the search
of his vehicle. (R., p. 132.) However, the district court found that the drug dog
alert gave the officers probable cause to search Eslinger’s vehicle and thus the
warrantless search of Eslinger’s vehicle was authorized by the automobile

2

Law enforcement’s contact with Eslinger was recorded and the state introduced
a transcribed copy of that recording at the suppression hearing. (See 5/12/15
Tr., p. 5, L. 25 – p. 6, L. 16; Ex. 1.)
2

exception. (R., p. 133.) The district court denied Eslinger’s motion to suppress.
(R., pp. 130-134.)
Pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement, Eslinger pled guilty to an amended
charge

of

possession

of

a

controlled

substance,

methamphetamine.

(R., pp. 149-153.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Eslinger reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p. 151.) The district court
entered judgment and sentenced Eslinger to four years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp. 158-159, 163-168.)

The district court suspended the sentence and

placed Eslinger on probation. (Id.) Eslinger timely appealed. (R., pp. 169-171.)

3

ISSUE
Eslinger states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eslinger’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Eslinger failed to show the district court erred when it held that a drug
dog’s alert established probable cause to search Eslinger’s vehicle pursuant to
the automobile exception?

4

ARGUMENT
Eslinger Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Determined That
An Alert By A Drug Dog Established Probable Cause To Search Eslinger’s
Vehicle Under The Automobile Exception
A.

Introduction
“Mindful of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,” Eslinger

argues on appeal “that, under the circumstances presented – specifically, the
fact that his vehicle was parked in the parking lot of a courthouse – the officers
violated the Fourth Amendment by searching his vehicle without first obtaining a
search warrant.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) It is well-established that an alert by a
reliable drug dog provides probable cause to search a vehicle under the
automobile exception. There is no “proximity to a courthouse” limitation to the
automobile exception. The district court did not err.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin,
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014).

C.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Alert By The Drug Dog
Provided Probable Cause To Search Eslinger’s Vehicle Under The
Automobile Exception
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain

5

special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira,
133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)). One such exception is
the “automobile exception,” which authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle
and the containers therein when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.

California v. Acevedo,

500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982);
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999). “Probable
cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items
to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime.”

State v.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Ross, 456 U.S. at 823). “A canine sniff of an automobile is not itself a search
that implicates a privacy interest, and thus it need not be justified by suspicion of
drug activity.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); State v.
Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 442, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Ct. App. 2001)). It is wellestablished that a positive alert by a drug dog provides probable cause to search
a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572;
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 875, 172 P.3d at 1150.
The district court held that the positive alert by Officer Shore’s drug dog
provided probable cause to search Eslinger’s vehicle under the automobile

6

exception and that the automobile exception still applied even though Eslinger’s
vehicle was parked at the courthouse. (See R., p. 133.)
On appeal, Eslinger is mindful of controlling case law but argues that the
automobile exception should not apply in courthouse parking lots.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) Eslinger does not cite any authority to support this
proposed exception to the automobile exception. Instead Eslinger argues that
the “public policy considerations underlying the automobile exception are not
implicated here, where the police officers could have obtained a search warrant
by simply walking a short distance to the courthouse.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
Eslinger’s public policy argument is misplaced.
The applicability of the automobile exception does not depend on whether
an officer has the ability to quickly get a warrant. “The automobile exception is
based both upon the automobile's ready mobility, which is deemed an exigency
sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the search
is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as
compared to the privacy interest in a home.” State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
281–82, 108 P.3d 424, 428–29 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 390-392 (1985); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d
1093, 1096 (1981)).

Eslinger does not address the “lesser expectation of

privacy” that Eslinger had in his automobile, but instead focuses only on the fact
the automobile was parked at the courthouse. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6.)
A parked vehicle is still subject to the automobile exception. See State v.
Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 809, 339 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Ct. App. 2014). “Absent
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some objective indicia of immobility, an automobile is presumed to be mobile.”
Id.; see also Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (automobile
exception still applies to a vehicle that has been impounded); Florida v. Meyers,
466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984) (same). Here there is no question that Eslinger’s
vehicle was readily mobile. The officers saw him drive it up to and in the parking
lot.

(10/27/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 23 – p. 6, L. 15.)

Thus, the two bases of the

automobile exception – ready mobility and lesser expectation of privacy – are
present here. The public policy behind the automobile exception has thus been
met. The district court did not err when it ruled that the positive alert by the drug
dog established probable cause to allow the officers to search Eslinger’s car
under the automobile exception.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2016.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of August, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd
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